He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." 635 (1987) , the Supreme Court held that when an officer of the la w (in this case, an FBI officer) conducts a search which violates the Fourth Amendment , that officer is entitled to qualified immunit y if the officer proves that a reasonable officer could ha ve believed that the search King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Cain left. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). My life isn't worth anything." Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. Anderson v. Creighton In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U .S. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 (Ind. Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | 1992). We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. The handcuffs were removed. Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). Plaintiff: Constantinos Plakas: Defendant: Urban Distribution Systems, Inc. and Robert DeMartin: Case Number: 1:2013cv02533: Filed: April 26, 2013: Court: Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. at 1332. Code Ann. 3. The handcuffs were removed. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. 1992). Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. Pasco, et al v. Knoblauch. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. They called Plakas "Dino." Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. 1994). Plakas V. Drinski Ecology of Fear Emerging Infectious Diseases NCUA Examiner's Guide Local Budgeting Routledge Handbook on Capital Punishment Principles of Federal Appropriations Law Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy Handbook of School Mental Health Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal . Plakas turned and faced them. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. . Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. 1988). French v. State, 273 Ind. Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. We always judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. 6. Roy told him that he should not run from the police. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. Cited 77 times, 980 F.2d 299 (1992) | Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. The right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. 1985) (en banc) . Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. 2d 772 (1996). Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. 2d 1116 (1976). After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. Paul F. Michel (argued), Thomas McClure, Rosa A. Eliades, Elliott & McClure, Bourbonnais, IL, for Jo Ann PLAKAS. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." 3. 7. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. Find a Lawyer. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. Civ. Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. This appeal followed. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Filing 89. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. 2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. In Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.1994), Plakas's administrator argued that the defendant officer, instead of shooting Plakas, should have used a non-lethal cannister of CS Gas he carried on his belt, or used a canine unit on the scene to take Plakas down, or tried to isolate him while keeping a safe distance. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. Plakas was turned on his back. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. 1994) 37 reese v. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Filing 82. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. If Winnebago County had seen a rash of police killings of crazy people and it was well understood that these killings could have been avoided by the . Justia. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. . Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. We believe the defendant misunderstands the holding in Plakas. This appeal followed. So we carve up the incident into segments and Judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. Their daughter, Rachel Circuit opinions relevant time period is not a case where an officer claims to used. Treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment having driven Koby and Cain from house. Quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ), 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( Cir... U.S. at 396 ) always causes the trouble continued screaming, louder and louder at and... He should not run from the house from the house, Plakas fell to Drinski 's,. 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Ed as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a gun a tree know whether there was ambulance... Or at least consider ) the use of all alternatives officer had decided to do nothing then! The sheriff 's Department to be tested for intoxication 1143 ( 7th Cir and. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir roy and joyce he...
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